ZOGBY
RESEARCH SERVICES

PALESTINE 2025

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SUMMARY FINDINGS

This is the third in a series of polls that Zogby Research Services conducted in the Palestinian occupied lands of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem for the Tony Blair Institute. What has come through quite clearly in each of these annual surveys is that as a result of the unique conditions Israel has imposed on these three Palestinian areas, there are distinct differences in the opinions of respondents in each of them toward their economic well-being, their governance, the threats they face, and their hopes for the future.

What follows are some top-line observations based on our 2025 poll, with comparisons with our earlier surveys where relevant.

1. Israel's war on Gaza has had devastating consequences for Palestinians in that impoverished land. Our findings demonstrate extremely high degrees of repeated forced evacuations, loss of family members, destruction of homes, scarcity of food, water, medical services, and adequate shelter.

2. There are clear indications of increased economic distress in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. These are the result of Israeli policies that inhibited independent economic development in these areas before the war and have only intensified since October 7th.

3. What has also increased are the severity of threats experienced by Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem emanating from settler violence, home demolitions, land seizures, forced expulsions, and raids from Israeli security forces.

4. Our findings also demonstrate a Palestinian crisis of confidence in their leadership. Over the past decade, we have observed a twist on the old adage "the devil you know is better than the devil you don't know." Palestinians in Gaza have demonstrated greater appreciation for the PA than have their compatriots in the West Bank. And Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have shown somewhat more support for Hamas than have Palestinians in Gaza. The war has taken a toll on attitudes toward both governing entities. Gazans blame Hamas and Israel for the war, and three quarters of West Bank Palestinians are dissatisfied with the PA's overall performance in response to the conflict.

   The bottom line is that it appears from our findings that Palestinians in Gaza want little to do with Hamas, while those in the West Bank have diminished regard for the role of the PA—although they do not support its dissolution either out of concern for the uncertainty that would follow or because of their belief in the future promise that the PA still represents.

   As a result of this divergence of views, while a majority of Gaza's Palestinians see a role for a reformed PA (under international supervision and with the support of states like Egypt and Qatar) in post-war governance, the majority of those in the West Bank and East Jerusalem favor either a national unity government of both the PA and Hamas or Hamas alone.

5. As we observed in the summary of our 2024 study, the impact of Israeli policies on all three areas has taken a severe toll.

   For two decades, Gaza was severed from the rest of the Palestinian population, economically strangled by Israel, with Hamas being both punished and then rewarded by the Israeli government as it sought to foster a division in Palestinian ranks. This was accomplished, enabling Hamas to grow in strength. The war has taken a devastating toll on Palestinian life in Gaza, fostering distrust of Hamas and anger toward Israel and the US, while creating an abiding despair in the population.

   The three-decade long closure of East Jerusalem has accomplished much the same. While before closure Palestinians from the rest of the West Bank came to Jerusalem for employment and services, two things happened after the clo-

sure: Palestinians in East Jerusalem lost their customers, clients and income, and were forced to accept employment in Israel; and the services that were once provided by institutions in the city were replaced by new ones that opened in West Bank communities. On the one hand, after three decades East Jerusalemites have come to some degree of accommodation with their lives and futures, but this is coupled with a deepening resentment for the state that governs them.

Israeli behavior has also taken a toll on the West Bank. Palestinians remain threatened by Israeli repression, restrictions, and expansionist policies. The PA, which once conveyed the promise of a Palestinian future, has increasingly come to be seen as humiliated by Israel, or as an agent of the occupation.

6. These factors—the devastation created by the war and Israeli policies that have negatively impacted Palestinians and created a loss of confidence in their leadership—have produced the crisis confronting Palestinians today. They know what they want—independence, security, an improved economy and better jobs, and improved services. For example, when Gazans are asked what state they most want their future to look like, far and away, they choose the UAE. But when asked for their preferred strategies moving forward, the plurality of respondents in the West Bank and Gaza say they just want the situation to revert to pre-October 7th, but with better paying jobs, and improved services and quality of life, followed by negotiations and non-armed resistance, and Palestinian reconciliation. In other words, with no real options available to them, they know what they want, but don't see a clear path forward.

7. Flowing from this, our 2025 findings point to some disturbing signs of despair. When faced with the destruction of their homes and communities and the threat of expulsion, an increased number of Palestinians in Gaza see no choice but to emigrate. About six in 10 respondents in all three areas say that given current political conditions and facts on the ground, they believe that they are close to a one-state reality in which Israel controls Palestinians throughout Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. And a substantial number of respondents are resigned to simply want to revert to pre-October 7th.

8. However, when presented with the Arab States Plan, despite Palestinians' conflicting or ambivalent attitudes towards who should govern Gaza and the future role of the PA or Hamas, there is strong support for this plan in Gaza and the West Bank—even though it includes "a committee of independent Palestinian experts under the supervision of the PA," and "Palestinian security forces trained by Egypt and Jordan to patrol Gaza and supervise Hamas and other militant groups."

9. The bottom line from our three years of polling is that the unique circumstances that Israel has imposed on Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem have created greater complexity in finding a path forward. The current circumstances are shaped by the devastation of Gaza and its people, the growing threat of Israel and its settlers in the West Bank, and increased economic distress in East Jerusalem. These problems are compounded by the degree to which Israel has disempowered and worked to discredit the Palestinian Authority and the inability of Palestinian leadership to provide a vision for the future and a strategy to get there.

   Current efforts of the international community focus on eliminating Hamas and reforming the PA. These proposals have garnered broad international support. But the real threat to peace and stability are the policies pursued by the Israeli government which has rejected any and all proposals that call for an end to their assault on Gaza, withdrawal of their forces, a role for the PA in Gaza, and any suggestion that Palestinian independence or sovereignty be on the agenda. This intransigence must be addressed.

   At this point the way forward must entail more than efforts requiring Palestinians or Arab states to do heavy lifting. What is required is a more holistic approach designed to demand changes in Israeli policies that have bred anger, resentment, disrespect for Palestinian institutions, and the growing degree of despair that has been created in the Palestinian constituency.

RESULTS

Between April 9 and May 12, 2025, we polled 1,435 Palestinian adults in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. This survey was a follow-up to a very similar study we conducted in late July–early August 2024. In both, we were measuring Palestinian attitudes toward the Israel war on Gaza and their hopes for the future. Before the war began in October of 2023, we had conducted a survey in June and July of 2023 asking some of the same questions of respondents. Because of the unique conditions Israel has imposed on the three areas, the polling and the report below present the findings separately.

What follows are results of the 2025 study, with comparisons with the earlier 2023 and 2024 polling highlighting where changes in attitudes have occurred.

1. GAZA: A CLOSER LOOK

A. CONDITIONS

Where did you live before Oct. 7?

	Gaza	
Districts	2024	2025
North Gaza	24	24
Gaza	48	47
Deir al-Balah	7	7
Khan Yunis	10	10
Rafah	12	12

Percentages may not add up to 100% becaoe of rounding.

How many times have you and your family had to relocate in the past 9 months?

	Gaza	
	2024	2025
1-3 times	48	35
4-6 times	37	37
7+	15	27

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

A greater number of Palestinians in Gaza reported being forced to relocate in 2025. In August 2024, 52% told us they had been forced to move at least four times. By May 2025, that percentage has increased to 64%. The percentage of the overall figure who had to relocate more than seven times has increased from 15% in 2024 to 27% in 2025.

Were you able to return to your original home district?	
	Gaza
	2025
Yes	23
No	77

Did you travel from south to north Gaza during the ceasefire?	
	Gaza
	2025
Yes	48
No	52

If you are aware of it, what is the current condition of the home you lived in prior to Oct. 7?	
	Gaza
	2025
Completely damaged – uninhabitable	70
Moderately damaged	19
Slightly damaged	4
Undamaged	3
Unknown	4

Which of the below most accurately describes your living situation?	
	Gaza
	2025
Returned to previous home	12
Rented new accommodation	10
Staying in a public shelter	14
Staying in a tent	51
Staying with relatives or friends	13

During the ceasefire, 48% report that they traveled from south to north, with an overall 23% making it as far as their home district. Seventy percent (70%) tell us that their homes have been completely destroyed, with 23% reporting that their homes have been moderately or slightly damaged. Only 3% say their homes are undamaged. At present, 12% have returned to and are living in their previous homes, while 51% are living in tents and another 14% living in public shelters.

How satisfied are you with the performance of the following entities in providing assistance to Gaza during the war?

	Gaza			
	2024		2025	
	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
UNWRA	77	23	69	31
Other international organizations	73	27	–	–
Other UN agencies (e.g., UNICEF, WFP, OCHA)	–	–	75	25
NGOs like ANERA, Rahma Worldwide, World Central Kitchen	–	–	56	44
Palestinian civil society organizations	44	56	32	68
Palestinian government entities in Gaza	39	61	23	77
Palestinian Authority	43	57	35	65

Satisfied is the aggregation of responses of "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied." Dissatisfied is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat dissatisfied" and "very dissatisfied."

If you were to remain in Gaza during reconstruction, which of the following entities would you prefer as a provider of a temporary camp/shelter?

	Gaza
	2025
Palestinian or Arab government-run entity	26
The UN	48
An NGO	9
Israel	5
None of the above. I would remain where I am	12

Overall, UNWRA and other UN agencies receive good grades (between 69% and 75% satisfaction) for their performance in providing aid and support. Palestinian government entities receive lower satisfaction ratings than they did in 2024. As a result, almost one-half of all respondents said that if they had to remain in Gaza during reconstruction, they would prefer a UN shelter, with another 26% preferring one that is Palestinian or Arab-government run.

Which of the following best describes your attitude towards remaining in or leaving Gaza?

	Gaza
	2025
I will not leave under any circumstances	38
I would leave temporarily while reconstruction takes place, but only if I am guaranteed that I can return	32
I would prefer to leave Gaza for another country	30

If you were to temporarily leave Gaza with the guarantee that you could return, where would you prefer to go? [Only asked of those who said they would leave temporarily.]

	Gazans willing to leave temporarily during reconstruction
	2025
Sinai—close to the Gaza border	12
Arab states	32
European states	49
North America	3
Other	4

There has been talk from US and Israeli leaders of displacing Palestinians from parts or all of Gaza. How concerned are you that these threats may be implemented?

	Gaza
	2025
Very concerned	45
Somewhat concerned	23
Somewhat unconcerned	11
Not concerned at all	22

Percentages may not add up to 100% becaoe of rounding.

When asked how concerned they are with talk from US and Israeli leaders of plans to displace them from all or parts of Gaza, 68% say they are concerned—including 45% who are "very concerned." As a result of the continuing insecurity, forced relocation, and starvation, the percentage of those respondents who say they would prefer to remain in Gaza is just 38%, with another 32% saying they would leave temporarily while reconstruction takes place, but only on the condition that they would be guaranteed the right to return. This total of 70% is a marked decline from the 88% who responded similarly in another study we conducted in September 2024. Overall, 30% now say they would prefer to leave for another country, up from the 12% who chose that option in 2024.

B. HAMAS

Over the years, our polling has shown that Palestinians in Gaza have demonstrated mixed attitudes toward Hamas rule. It was the government they had, but not necessarily the one they wanted.

With which political group do you most identify?

	Gaza	
	2024	2025
Fatah	31	44
Hamas	14	3

In 2024, when we asked with which Palestinian political party respondents most identified, 31% said they preferred Fatah, while only 14% said Hamas. This two-to-one ratio had held constant for several years. But when we asked this same question in 2025, we found a precipitous decline in support for Hamas, with 44% saying they identify with Fatah and only 3% saying Hamas.

What is the level of responsibility of each of the following for the current conflict in Gaza today?

	Gaza			
	2024		2025	
	Responsible	Not responsible	Responsible	Not responsible
Hamas	87	13	92	8
PA	58	42	41	59
Israel	85	15	93	7
US	83	17	93	7

Respondents used a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being "very responsible" to 4 being "not responsible at all." Responsible is the aggregation of responses of "1" and "2." Not responsible is the aggregation of responses of "3" and "4."

Ninety-two percent (92%) of respondents say they hold Hamas responsible for the conflict in Gaza, similar to the 93% who hold Israel and the US responsible. Only 41% in the current survey place any responsibility on the Palestinian Authority for the conflict in Gaza today.

Before Oct. 7 how satisfied were you with Hamas' handling of each of the following . . .

	Gaza	
	2025	
	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
Governance (e.g. laws, regulations, rule of law)	52	48
Security (e.g. military wing, civil police)	65	35
Fiscal/economic (e.g. taxation, price controls)	45	55
Service provision (e.g. distributing aid, health, education, issuing documentation)	45	55

Satisfied is the aggregation of responses of "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied." Dissatisfied is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat dissatisfied" and "very dissatisfied."

In which areas and to what extent does Hamas still control the Gaza Strip today?

	Gaza			
	2025			
	Completely	To a significant degree	To a limited degree	Not at all
Governance (e.g. laws, regulations, rule of law)	23	13	38	25
Security (e.g. military wing, civil police)	13	11	42	34
Fiscal/economic (e.g. taxation, price controls)	21	7	22	50
Service provision (e.g. distributing aid, health, education, issuing documentation)	16	11	31	42

Percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding.

When respondents were asked to recall their level of satisfaction with Hamas' performance in several areas before October 7th, about one-half express at least some level of satisfaction with governance, economic, and provision of services, with almost two-thirds expressing the same with regard to security matters. After more than a year and one-half of conflict, about one-quarter or more of respondents still see Hamas as exercising at least a significant degree of control over matters related to security, economic, and the provision of services. More than one-third say the group continues to exercise some control over governance.

C. HAMAS VS PA

Which entity would you prefer to govern Gaza immediately after the war?

	Gaza	
	2024	2025
Hamas	7	4
The PA under Abbas ^	23	35
A national unity government including Hamas and Fateh	17	22
A transitional international coalition working with a local Gaza administration made up of Gazan representatives#	29	27
UN	9	–
A coalition of Arab/Islamic countries	12	–
Israel	3	5
Other/Refused	–	7

In 2024 some of the options had slightly different wording: ^A reformed and strengthened PA under Abbas, #Gaza administration made up of Gazan representatives (with international oversight and linked to the PA). "UN" and "A coalition of Arab/Islamic countries" were not options in 2025. Percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Should the PA's return to governing Gaza be conditional upon reforms?

	Gazan respondents who said "The PA under Abbas" to the previous question
	2025
Yes	89
No	11

Given this ambivalence, it should not be surprising that when asked whom they would prefer to govern Gaza after the war, only 4% say Hamas, but 22% choose a national unity government that includes both Hamas and Fatah. This represents an uptick in support for the idea of a unity government from 2024 when it was only 17%. Far and away, however, the preferred option is the PA at 35%, followed by a transitional international coalition working with a local Gaza administration made up of Gazan representatives (27%).

Almost nine in 10 respondents who indicate a preference for the PA under Abbas to govern Gaza immediately after the war also feel that the PA's return should be conditional upon reforms.

Which entity would you prefer to see in control of overall security in the Gaza Strip immediately following the war?	
	Gaza
	2025
Israeli military	4
Hamas security forces	8
PA security forces	40
International coalition forces	42
Private military contractor(s)	6

When asked whom they would prefer to see in control of security in the Gaza Strip after the war, only 8% choose Hamas, with 40% saying PA security forces and another 42% saying international coalition forces.

If an international coalition were to be established to govern and secure Gaza, which powers would you like to see incorporated? [Select all that apply.]	
	Gaza
	2025
Saudi Arabia	19
United Arab Emirates	19
Qatar	46
Egypt	37
Jordan	17
Another Muslim Country	10
US	14
Other	>1
None	3

If a job were available, would you consider a job with the Palestinian Authority/Hamas?		
	Gaza	
	2024	2025
Yes, with either PA/Hamas.	14	14
No, with neither.	42	38
Only with the PA.	40	46
Only with Hamas.	4	2
A coalition of Arab/Islamic countries	12	5
Israel	3	1

And when asked if in the post-war period they would consider a job with the PA or Hamas, only 2% say only with Hamas, 14% say with either, while 46% say only with the PA. Thirty-eight percent (38%) say with neither.

D. LOOKING FORWARD

The Arab States have offered a plan for Gaza. It consists of the following terms:

- $53 billion investment for 5-year reconstruction of Gaza without displacing Palestinians
- Committee of independent Palestinian experts under the supervision of the PA to govern Gaza
- International peacekeeping force to oversee security in Gaza after Israeli troop withdrawal
- Palestinian security forces trained by Egypt and Jordan to patrol Gaza and supervise Hamas and other militant groups

How supportive are you of this plan?

	Gaza
	2025
Support	89
Opposed	11

Support is the aggregation of responses of "strongly support" and "somewhat support." Opposed is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat opposed" and "strongly opposed."

By a margin of 89% to 11% respondents said they support the Arab states' plan for Gaza.

What is your preferred long-term solution to the conflict with Israel?

	Gaza
	2025
A two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.	63
A one state solution with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis.	13
A confederation between two states of Palestine and Israel.	3
None of the above.	21

Under the current political conditions and given the facts on the ground, how close do you think we are to a one-state reality—where Israel controls Palestinians throughout Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza?

	Gaza		
	2023	2024	2025
Very close	7	13	27
Somewhat close	30	23	35
Not very close	40	33	16
Very far	22	32	22

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

As for the future, 63% say they prefer a two-state solution as opposed to only 13% who express support for a one-state solution. They say this despite holding the pessimistic view that the region is close to a one-state reality in which Israel controls Palestinians throughout Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. This view has grown significantly in the last two years—from 37% of Gazans who thought we were at least somewhat close to a one-state reality in 2023 to 62% who

now hold that view in 2025.

Of the following political strategies to advance Palestinian national interests, which is the most desirable?		
	Gaza	
	2024	2025
Negotiations and peaceful non-armed resistance.	14	24
Resistance to occupation, including armed struggle.	10	4
A combination of both negotiations/peaceful non-armed resistance and resistance to occupation, including armed struggle.	16	–
Dissolve the PA	–	12
Unify the Palestinian ranks, dissolve the PA, and call for one-state with equal rights for all citizens.	33	–
Palestinian reconciliation	–	27
Continue the situation as it was pre-Oct. 7 but press for more and better paying jobs and improvement in services and quality of life.	27	33

N.B.: Despite the fact that the options presented to respondents in 2024 and 2025 differed, we present both for comparison.

As for the most desirable strategy moving forward, 27% support Palestinian reconciliation, 24% support negotiations and peaceful non-armed resistance, while only 4% support resistance to occupation, including armed struggle. A sign of the degree to which Gaza's Palestinians remain pessimistic is that the number one option they choose is to continue the situation as it was pre-October 7th but with more and better paying jobs, and improvement in security and the quality of life.

E. ADDITIONAL DATA

If you were to imagine a vision for Gaza's future, which state(s) would you most like Gaza to be like?	
	Gaza
	2025
Saudi Arabia	12
United Arab Emirates	27
Egypt	11
Turkey	15
Islamic Republic of Iran	2
Singapore	14
UK	10
Other	5
Qatar	3
Jordan	2

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

II. WEST BANK AND EAST JERUSALEM

Palestinians in East Jerusalem and those in the West Bank live under very different circumstances imposed by the Israeli occupation. The Old City and 28 Palestinian villages have been annexed to Israel and are now cut off from the rest of the West Bank by a wall. While Jerusalem was once the economic, social and political hub of Palestinian life, this is no longer the case. The PA is not allowed to function in this area, and West Bank Palestinians can only cross into Jerusalem with great difficulty. In the West Bank, increased settlement expansion and violent Israeli military and settler assaults on Palestinian villages and landowners have created real hardships. As a result of Israeli imposed restrictions on economic development, the two major sources for employment for Palestinians have been public sector jobs with the PA and working in Israel or in Israeli settlements. Since October 7, both have been impacted. Permits for employment in Israel and settlements have been largely curtailed and Palestinian tax revenues collected by Israel that are required to be transferred to the PA have been withheld.

Despite the circumstances unique to each of these areas, it is useful to compare the changes in their attitudes from 2023 to 2024 and 2025 with regard to their economic well-being, governance, the threats they face, and their hopes for the future. We also compare attitudes on the war in Gaza between respondents in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

A. CONDITIONS

1. ECONOMIC

When you think about your personal economic situation, are you better off or worse off than you were 5 years ago, or is there no difference in your situation?

	2023		2024		2025	
	West Bank	East Jerusalem	West Bank	East Jerusalem	West Bank	East Jerusalem
Better off	28	55	15	37	16	15
Worse off	33	14	58	38	63	46
No difference	38	11	27	25	21	39

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

In 2023, more than half of Palestinians in East Jerusalem (55%) and 28% of Palestinians in the West Bank reported satisfaction with their personal economic situation. But much has changed since then. By 2024, 37% of Palestinians in East Jerusalem and only 15% in the West Bank reported that their economic situation was better off than it had been five years earlier. Eight months later, with the level of economic satisfaction having declined or stagnated among the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the percentage of those who say they are better off in both areas is now the same (15-16%).

Current Employment Status

	2023		2024		2025	
	West Bank	East Jerusalem	West Bank	East Jerusalem	West Bank	East Jerusalem
Employed	42	50	31	67	29	58
Unemployed	10	12	23	6	29	10
Retired	4	4	2	5	3	2
Student	13	2	13	5	8	12
Homemaker	30	16	31	16	30	16

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Where are you employed? [Asked of those who responded "Employed"]

	West Bank [Employed]			East Jerusalem [Employed]		
	2023	2024	2025	2023	2024	2025
Self-employed in my own business in Palestine	15	32	35	19	17	18
Work for a company/business in the private sector in Palestine	25	23	26	3	2	4
Work in the public sector (government office, security forces, etc.) in Palestine	23	26	31	6	2	8
Work for a non-profit or international entity in Palestine	5	7	1	3	5	7
Work in Israel	28	11	5	53	65	61
Work in an Israeli settlement	4	2	1	16	8	3

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Considering your family income, would you say that…

	2023		2024		2025	
	West Bank	East Jerusalem	West Bank	East Jerusalem	West Bank	East Jerusalem
It is more than enough to take care of our needs, enjoy life, and save for the future.	5	17	6	11	6	14
It is just enough and we are able to get by.	46	57	49	54	43	58
It is not enough and we have some difficulty getting by.	49	26	45	35	52	28

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

As has been noted in the introduction to this section, the major factor accounting for this difference in the economic satisfaction levels between the West Bank and East Jerusalem is that while Israel has imposed severe restrictions on economic development in the West Bank, Palestinians in East Jerusalem have been incorporated into the Israeli economy. As a result, the percent of those employed is twice as high in East Jerusalem, while the percent of those who are unemployed and looking for work is three times higher in the West Bank.

What comes through dramatically in the comparison of the data from 2023 to 2025 is the fact that unemployment in the West Bank has risen from 10% in 2023, to 23% in 2024, to 29% in 2025. At the same time there is a dislocation of the workforce. In 2023, 32% reported working in Israel and the settlements. By 2025, that had dropped to 6%. And as a result of Israeli restrictions on international NGOs operating in the occupied West Bank, employment in this sector declined from 5% to 1% of the workforce. Some of this dislocation can be seen to account for the dramatic rise in Palestinians who now say they are self-employed.

What also comes through in the poll is the higher levels of economic hardship faced by West Bank families with more than one-half reporting that the income they receive is not enough and that they have difficulty getting by—a figure almost double the percentage of those in the same predicament in East Jerusalem.

When you look to the future, 5 years from now, do you feel that your personal situation will be better off of worse off than it is today, or do you feel that there will be no difference in your situation?

	2023		2024		2025	
	West Bank	East Jerusalem	West Bank	East Jerusalem	West Bank	East Jerusalem
Better off	37	46	23	14	46	28
Worse off	29	17	41	44	28	29
No difference	34	38	36	42	26	42

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Even with these high levels of economic dissatisfaction, there is a significant rise in the levels of optimism in both areas. In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the percentage of those who say they feel they'll be better off on the next five years has doubled since 2024.

2. THREATS

How serious a threat do you view each of the following to you and your future? Responses of "A very serious threat"

	West Bank			East Jerusalem		
	2023	2024	2025	2023	2024	2025
Settler violence	72	79	91	76	95	93
Israeli security forces raiding Palestinian communities	53	78	87	35	89	89
Israeli home demolitions	69	81	92	29	96	90
Israeli land seizures	67	81	91	58	94	94
The behaviour of Palestinian security forces	35	47	25	21	50	–
Breakdown in law and order	–	56	69	–	79	75
The lack of leadership by the PA/Hamas	45	54	50	23	71	51
Violent acts by Palestinian groups or individuals that result in Israeli attacks	45	51	53	30	72	71
The Israeli checkpoints and economic restrictions	56	69	87	40	94	76
Forced expulsions of Palestinians from [the West Bank/East Jerusalem]	–	–	91	–	–	92

For the past three years, we've asked respondents in East Jerusalem and the West Bank to evaluate the seriousness of a number of different threats they might experience. In 2025, around nine in 10 Palestinians in East Jerusalem and in the West Bank say that the most serious threats they face come from settler violence, home demolitions, land seizures, forced expulsions, and raids by Israeli security forces. There are marked increases in concern about the severity of these threats since 2023.

While almost nine in 10 West Bank Palestinians report that Israeli checkpoints and economic restrictions are a severe threat, that number is slightly lower in East Jerusalem (76%). The percentage of those in both areas who see the breakdown in law and order as a serious threat is about seven in 10 respondents. But while violent acts by Palestinian groups that result in Israeli attacks scores a high seven in 10 among East Jerusalemites, this is only seen as a serious threat by about half of those in the West Bank. The least serious threats for both groups of Palestinian respondents is the lack of leadership by the PA/Hamas and, for those in the West Bank, the "behavior of Palestinian security forces."

B. THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

The performance and promise of the Palestinian Authority has suffered among respondents in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority in each of the following areas:

	West Bank					
	2023		2024		2025	
	Effective	Not Effective	Effective	Not Effective	Effective	Not Effective
Providing services	49	21	44	31	34	37
Providing security and safety	35	37	35	36	34	41
Dealing with the Israeli government	35	35	37	35	37	43
Stopping corruption and favoritism	28	42	28	47	34	44
Protecting personal and political freedom	30	35	34	33	30	47
Serving the interests of the Palestinian people	38	33	33	34	30	47

Respondents used a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being "very effective" to 5 being "not effective at all." Effective is the aggregation of responses of "1" and "2." Not effective is the aggregation of responses of "4" and "5." Percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "3" are not included.

How effective has the PA's response been to the conflict in Gaza?

	West Bank	
	2024	2025
Very effective	4	6
Somewhat effective	34	19
Somewhat ineffective	42	28
Very ineffective	21	47

Percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding.

When asked to evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Authority, respondents in the West Bank have consistently (2023 to 2025) given the PA low scores in every area: services, security, dealing with the Israeli government, stopping corruption, protecting personal and political freedom, and serving the interests of the Palestinian people. The PA's effectiveness rating for providing services has fallen from 49% in 2023 to 34% in 2025. The PA is viewed by three-quarters of West Bank residents as having been ineffective in its response to the conflict in Gaza.

To what extent do you view the PA as representing each of the following?

	2023				2024				2025			
	West Bank		East Jerusalem		West Bank		East Jerusalem		West Bank		East Jerusalem	
	Rep	Not Rep	Rep	Not Rep	Rep	Not Rep	Rep	Not Rep	Rep	Not Rep	Rep	Not Rep
A future Palestinian state, or a state-in-the-making	68	32	65	35	59	41	77	23	46	54	35	65
A service provider and a source of benefits and employment	50	50	32	68	53	47	71	29	43	57	46	54
An entity that works for the Israeli occupation	39	61	45	55	55	45	59	41	44	56	46	54
A failure that should be dismantled	47	53	55	45	59	41	37	63	48	52	41	59

Respondents used a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being "very much" to 4 being "not at all." Representative is the aggregation of responses of 1 and 2. Not Representative is the aggregation of responses of 3 and 4.

Respondents were also asked what they viewed the PA as representing for the future. While in 2024, majorities in both areas saw the PA as representing a future Palestinian state in the making and a service provider, now slight majorities do not see it as representing either. In 2024, slight majorities in East Jerusalem and the West Bank saw the PA as an entity that worked for the Israeli occupation, but in 2025 attitudes have been reversed with majorities disagreeing. And slight majorities in both areas do not see the PA as a failure that should be dismantled.

Do you think security coordination between the PA and Israel has an overall positive or negative impact on Palestinians living in the West Bank?

	2024		2025	
	West Bank	East Jerusalem	West Bank	East Jerusalem
Very positive	2	5	9	9
Somewhat positive	29	21	33	43
Somewhat negative	44	32	32	23
Very negative	24	42	27	25

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

When asked whether security cooperation between the PA and Israel has had an overall positive or negative impact on Palestinians in the West Bank, the percentages of those saying it has had a positive impact increased from 31% in the West Bank and 26% in East Jerusalem in 2024 to 42% in the West Bank and 52% in East Jerusalem.

Please evaluate the effectiveness of the Israeli government in each of the following areas:

	East Jerusalem			
	2024		2025	
	Effective	Not Effective	Effective	Not Effective
Providing services	43	30	22	57
Providing security and safety	40	35	16	66
Stopping corruption and favoritism	35	40	18	65
Protecting personal and political freedom	46	27	20	66

Respondents used a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being "very effective" to 5 being "not effective at all." Effective is the aggregation of responses of "1" and "2." Not effective is the aggregation of responses of "4" and "5." Percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "3" are not included.

Because Palestinians in East Jerusalem are governed by Israel and not the PA, we asked respondents in this area to evaluate the effectiveness of the Israeli government in providing services, security, dealing with the Israeli government stopping corruption, and protecting personal and political freedom. While, in 2024, Israel was more likely to be seen as somewhat more effective than ineffective in most areas, in 2025, its ratings plummeted across the board. From an average of 40% in each of the areas in 2024, Israel's effectiveness ratings have now declined to slightly less than 20%.

C. REFORMS

In 2024, the PA formed its 19th government led by Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa.

To what extent do you view the new 19th Palestinian government led by Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Mustafa as legitimate and representative?

	West Bank	
	2024	2025
1. Very legitimate/representative	10	15
2.	35	22
3.	37	19
4. Not at all legitimate/representative	18	44

In 2024 and 2025, West Bank Palestinians were asked whether they viewed this government as legitimate and representative. In 2024, 45% said that it was at least somewhat legitimate and representative. By 2025, that had declined to 37%.

To what extent do you expect that the new government is governing effectively?

	West Bank	
	2024	2025
Very likely to be effective	4	7
Likely to be effective	43	41
Unlikely to be effective	40	26
Very unlikely to be effective	13	26

In 2024, the question was "To what extent do you expect that the new government will govern effectively?"

When asked if they expect this government to be effective, in 2024, 47% of Palestinians in the West Bank expected that it would likely be effective; in 2025 this is virtually unchanged.

PM Dr. Mohammad Mustafa has laid out plans for a comprehensive reform agenda to be carried out by the PA. To what extent do you agree that the PA requires reform?

	West Bank	
	2024	2025
Not at all	3	5
Superficial reform	16	11
Moderate reform	36	27
Deep reform	45	58

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

When asked their views of the need for PA reform, 58% say the government requires deep reform, as opposed to only 16% who suggest that the PA needs either no reform or only superficial reform.

Rank the following reforms in terms of importance – from 1 to 5, with 1 being the most important priority and 5 being the least important priority.

	West Bank	
Rank	2024	2025
1	Service provision (e.g. education, health, digitisation)	Security (e.g. Palestinian Security Forces, civil police)
2	Governance (e.g. corruption, rule of law, regulation)	Economic/fiscal (e.g. trade, finance, business)
3	Security (e.g. Palestinian Security Forces, civil police)	Service provision (e.g. education, health, digitisation)
4	Economic/fiscal (e.g. trade, finance, business)	Governance (e.g. corruption, rule of law, regulation)
5	Democratic (e.g. PLO reform, elections, freedom of expression)	Democratic (e.g. PLO reform, elections, freedom of expression)

In both 2024 and 2025 we asked respondents in the West Bank to identify the most important reforms that were necessary. The changes in the two years are worth noting. In 2024 the top ranked issue was providing services (like education and health care), followed by governance (including fighting corruption rule of law), internal security, economic matters, and democratic reforms. In 2025 the ranked order has shifted significantly. The top issue is now internal security followed by economic matters, service provision, governance, and democratic reforms in last place.

D. LOOKING FORWARD

1) GAZA'S FUTURE

A) THE ARAB STATES PLAN

The Arab States have offered a plan for Gaza. It consists of the following terms:

- $53 billion investment for 5-year reconstruction of Gaza without displacing Palestinians
- Committee of independent Palestinian experts under the supervision of the PA to govern Gaza
- International peacekeeping force to oversee security in Gaza after Israeli troop withdrawal
- Palestinian security forces trained by Egypt and Jordan to patrol Gaza and supervise Hamas and other militant groups

How supportive are you of this plan?

	2025		
	Gaza	West Bank	East Jerusalem
Support	89	76	50
Opposed	11	24	50

Support is the aggregation of responses of "strongly support" and "somewhat support." Opposed is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat opposed" and "strongly opposed."

Respondents in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem were asked whether they support the Arab States Plan to end the conflict in Gaza. As noted above, 89% of respondents in Gaza express support for this plan, as do 76% in the West Bank. But among Palestinians in East Jerusalem opinion is divided with 50% supportive of the plan and 50% opposed.

B) WHO WILL GOVERN GAZA POST-CONFLICT?

Which entity would you prefer to govern Gaza immediately after the war?

	2024			2025		
	Gaza	West Bank	East Jerusalem	Gaza	West Bank	East Jerusalem
Hamas	7	38	23	4	28	26
The PA under Abbas^	23	9	3	35	11	9
A national unity government including Hamas and Fateh	17	34	8	22	45	31
A transitional international coalition working with a local Gaza administration made up of Gazan representatives	29	11	9	27	10	7
UN	9	2	6	–	–	–
A coalition of Arab/Islamic countries	12	5	36	–	–	–
Israel	3	1	16	5	1	2
Other/Refused	–	–	–	7	6	25

In 2024 some of the options had slightly different wording: ^A reformed and strengthened PA under Abbas, #Gaza administration made up of Gazan representatives (with international oversight and linked to the PA). "UN" and "A coalition of Arab/Islamic countries" were not options in 2025. Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

When asked which entity they would prefer to govern Gaza immediately after the war, respondents in East Jerusalem and the West Bank differ significantly from those in Gaza. While only 4% of Gazans want Hamas to govern, 28% of Palestinians in the West Bank and 26% of those in East Jerusalem see Hamas as the preferred governing entity. And while 22% of Gazans want a national unity government that includes both Hamas and Fatah, that is the preferred option for 45% in the West Bank and 31% in East Jerusalem.

2) FUTURE STRATEGY

There is a lack of clarity in attitudes toward strategies Palestinians should pursue in the future and the preferred long-term solution to the conflict.

Of the following political strategies to advance Palestinian national interests, which is the most desirable?

	2024			2025		
	Gaza	West Bank	East Jerusalem	Gaza	West Bank	East Jerusalem
Negotiations and peaceful non-armed resistance.	14	14	9	24	24	14
Resistance to occupation, including armed struggle.	10	23	28	4	18	22
A combination of both negotiations/peaceful non-armed resistance and resistance to occupation, including armed struggle.	16	28	6	–	–	–
Dissolve the PA	–	–	–	12	10	6
Unify the Palestinian ranks, dissolve the PA, and call for one-state with equal rights for all citizens.	33	23	29	–	–	–
Palestinian reconciliation	–	–	–	27	23	38
Continue the situation as it was pre Oct. 7 but press for more and better paying jobs and improvement in services and quality of life.	27	13	29	33	26	20

N.B.: Despite the fact that the options presented to respondents in 2024 and 2025 differed, we present both for comparison.

One-quarter of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank want to pursue negotiations and peaceful non-armed resistance and only 4% of Palestinians in Gaza see armed resistance as a path forward. But 18% of West Bank Palestinians and 22% of Jerusalemites favor armed resistance.

The absence of a strategy and a heightened degree of pessimism can be seen in the high percentages of respondents in all areas who see national reconciliation as the strategic option and those who simply want to continue the situation as it was pre-October 7 but pressing for more and better paying jobs and improvement in services and quality of life.

What is your preferred long-term solution to the conflict with Israel?

	2025		
	Gaza	West Bank	East Jerusalem
A two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.	63	42	12
A one state solution with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis.	13	14	10
A confederation between two states of Palestine and Israel.	3	3	2
None of the above.	21	41	76

There are mixed views on what the preferred long-term solution would be to end the conflict with Israel. Sixty-three percent (63%) of Palestinians in Gaza choose a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. A plurality of West Bankers (42%) also prefer that solution. In second place in both the West Bank (14%) and Gaza (12%) is a one-state solution with equal rights for both Palestinians and Israelis. In East Jerusalem, on the other hand, none of the options garners more than 12%. It's important to note that the percentage of Palestinians who say they have no preferred solution is extremely high: 76% in East Jerusalem, 41% in the West Bank, and 21% in Gaza.

Under the current political conditions and given the facts on the ground, how close do you think we are to a one-state reality—where Israel controls Palestinians throughout Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza?

	2023			2024			2025		
	Gaza	West Bank	East Jerusalem	Gaza	West Bank	East Jerusalem	Gaza	West Bank	East Jerusalem
Very close	7	4	9	13	5	27	27	26	34
Somewhat close	30	39	26	23	40	42	35	31	27
Not very close	40	48	30	33	38	19	16	12	10
Very far	22	9	36	32	17	12	22	32	28

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

And when asked whether under the current political conditions and facts on the ground, how close respondents in all three areas think that Palestinians are to a one-state reality in which Israel controls Palestinians throughout Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, around 60% of respondents in all three areas express the belief that "we are at least somewhat close to that reality." These percentages are markedly higher than in 2023 and 2024 when majorities in the West Bank and Gaza said a one-state reality was "not very close" or "very far."

E. ADDITIONAL DATA

Where do you go for political guidance?			
	2025		
	Gaza	West Bank	East Jerusalem
Religious leaders	9	16	14
Political leaders	22	10	4
Leaders in my community	4	7	3
Leaders in my family/clan	25	22	10
No one	40	46	69

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Think back to prior to Oct. 7. Has your source of political guidance changed since then?			
	2025		
	Gaza	West Bank	East Jerusalem
Yes	49	33	40
No	51	67	60

An indication of the low level of confidence in political groups and leaders and religious leaders is the fact that when asked to whom they go for political guidance, the single largest number of respondents in all three areas say "No one"—40% in Gaza, 46% in the West Bank, and 69% in East Jerusalem.

DEMOGRAPHICS

	Gaza	West Bank	East Jerusalem
Male	52	50	50
Female	48	50	50
Under 30	40	31	40
30-44	37	35	38
45+	23	34	21
Not college educated	64	67	56
College educated	36	33	44
Urban	77	67	75
Rural	6	26	14
Refugee camp	17	7	11
Refugee	66	26	43
Not a refugee	34	74	57
Fatah	44	19	8
Hamas	3	14	16

	Gaza	West Bank	East Jerusalem
Sample size	426	759	250
Margin of error	±4.8	±3.6	±6.3
Dates of survey	4/12/2025–5/7/2025	4/9/2025–5/8/2025	4/13/2025–5/12/2025
Geography covered	North Gaza, Gaza City, Deir al-Balah, Khan Yunis, Rafah	Jenin, Tubas, Tulkarem, Qal-qilya, Salfit, Nablus, Ramal-lah and Al-Bireh, Jericho, Bethlehem, Hebron, Jerusalem	